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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jonathan R. Christian appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction
entered after Christian entered Alford 1 pleas to battery with the intent to commit murder
and attempted strangulation. Christian argues that the district court erred when it denied
his motion to withdraw his Alford pleas.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On April 13, 2017, officers from the Caldwell Police Department responded to a
reported disturbance. (R., p.18.) “[T]he reporting party had stated a female was being
beaten and that the female is begging for mercy.” (Id.) When the first officer arrived at
the residence, “he could hear a female say ‘please…please…please’ followed by a male
say[ing] ‘its [sic] gonna be murder suicide.’” (R., p.19.) The officers entered the residence
and found Jonathan R. Christian, who was completely nude, and his wife. (R., pp.18-19.)
Christian’s wife “was bleeding from the face and had numerous bruises all over her.” (R.,
p.18.) She told the officers that, over the course of the last three days, Christian had held
her against her will at the residence, repeatedly beat her, choked her with his hands, choked
her with a cell phone charging cord until it broke, and repeatedly told her “‘[y]our [sic]
going to die now bitch.’” (R., pp.18-19.)
A grand jury indicted Christian on numerous offenses: battery with the intent to
commit a serious felony, two counts of attempted strangulation, two counts of felony
domestic battery, false imprisonment, and intentional destruction of a telecommunication
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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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device. (R., pp.29-32.) The state also charged Christian with being a persistent violator
under I.C. § 19-2514. (R., pp.54-55.) Christian pled not guilty to all of the charges on
April 28, 2017. (R., pp.6-7.)
Christian noticed a change-of-plea hearing for July 20, 2017. (R, p.9.) At the start
of the hearing, Christian’s attorney informed the district court that Christian was “not
prepared to change his plea now.” (Tr., p.1, Ls.13-14.) The district court informed
Christian that his case had been set for trial the following week and arraigned Christian on
the persistent violator charge. (Tr., p.1, L.15 – p.3, L.2.) At the end of the hearing,
Christian asked the district court, “how can I get like a different counsel” because “I feel
insufficient counsel.” (Tr., p.3, Ls.9-12.) The district court noted for the record that
Christian had requested different counsel but denied his request. (Tr., p.3, L.13 – p.4, L.6.)
On July 28, 2017, the parties stipulated to mediation. (R., pp.61-62.) The district
court appointed District Judge Christopher S. Nye to mediate the case and set the case for
mediation on August 8, 2017. (R., pp.63-64.) The result of the mediation was a binding
Rule 11 plea agreement. (Tr., p.6, L.7 – p.7, L.7; -see R., pp.69-73.) Christian agreed to
plead guilty to one count of battery with the intent to commit a serious felony and one count
of attempted strangulation. (R., p.69.) The state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts,
including the persistent violator charge. (Id.) The parties agreed that the district court
would “impose a unified sentence of fifteen years with two years fixed and thirteen years
indeterminate.” (R., p.70.) The plea agreement also stated “[t]he Defendant acknowledges
that he is entering into this stipulated, binding plea agreement knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently . . . .” (R., p.70.) And that “[t]he Defendant specifically states that he has read
this agreement, that he has had this agreement read and explained to him by his attorney,
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and that he is entering into this agreement knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and
with a full understanding of its contents.” (R., p.72.) The prosecutor, Christian’s counsel,
and Christian all signed the plea agreement. (R., pp.72-73.)
On the same day as the mediation, August 8, 2017, Christian filled out a guilty plea
advisory form. (R., pp.74-87.) Among other things, Christian indicated on the form that
(1) he was “capable of understanding these proceedings,” (2) there was nothing “going on
in [his] life that affects [his] ability to enter a voluntary guilty plea,” (3) he was not “having
any difficulty in understanding what [he was] doing by filling out this form,” (4) there was
no “reason that [he could not] make a reasoned and informed decision in this case,” (5) he
had “discussed the elements of the offense(s) for which [he was] charged with [his]
attorney,” (6) he was “entering [his] plea freely and voluntarily,” (7) he did not have “any
trouble answering any of the questions in [t]his form,” (8) he did not “need any additional
time before [he] entere[ed] [his] guilty plea(s),” and (9) he understood “that if the Court
accepts [his] guilty plea(s) that [he] may not be able to withdraw [his] plea(s) at a later
date.” (R., pp.77-78, 80, 84-85.)
The guilty plea advisory form also had an entire section dedicated to Christian’s
relationship with his attorney. (R., pp.83-84.) In that section, among other things,
Christian agreed that (1) he “had sufficient time to discuss [his] case with [his] attorney,”
(2) he “had the opportunity to review the discovery provided by [his] attorney,” (3) he did
not “want [his] attorney to take any further action in this case,” and (4) he was “satisfied
with [his] attorney’s representation.” (Id.) Christian signed and dated the guilty plea
advisory form. (R., p.85.)
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Later that same day, the district court held a change-of-plea hearing. (Tr., p.6, Ls.19.) The district court confirmed that Christian had read the plea agreement and that it was
consistent with his understanding of the agreement that had been reached in mediation.
(Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.7.) Christian’s counsel explained to the district court that Christian
was entering Alford pleas because “there’s a lot of this he doesn’t recall and remember.”
(Tr., p.8, L.17 – p.9, L.6.) Christian told the district court that he had reviewed the state’s
evidence and determined that “there is a likelihood that a jury would convict [him].” (Tr.,
p.9, Ls.12-25.) Christian also told the district court that he was entering his pleas
voluntarily. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.)
The district court accepted Christian’s pleas. (Tr., p.11, Ls.5-22.) The district court
informed Christian that “[t]he charge in Count One is battery with the intent to commit a
serious felony” and explained that the state alleged he “attempted to strangle [his wife] by
a cell phone cord with the intent to commit murder.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.5-10.) The district
court asked Christian if he pled guilty. (Tr., p.11, L.10.) Christian answered yes. (Tr.,
p.11, L.11.) The district court informed Christian that “in Count Two it accuses you on
April 12, 2017, of willfully and unlawfully choking and or attempting to strangle [your
wife] with a cell phone cord.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.12-15.) The district court asked Christian if
he pled guilty. (Tr., p.11, L.15.) Christian answered yes. (Tr., p.11, L.16.)
On August 28, 2017, the district court held a sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.13, Ls.110.) At the start of the hearing, Christian’s counsel informed the district court that Christian
wanted to withdraw his guilty plea and asked for some time to put together a motion “to
cite a basis for his wanting to withdraw his plea.” (Tr., p.13, L.17 – p.14, L.10.) The state
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indicated that it would oppose any motion to withdraw. (Tr., p.14, Ls.13-17.) The district
court ended the hearing without imposing a sentence. (Tr., p.14, L.18 – p.15, L.13.)
On September 7, 2017, Christian filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (R.,
pp.94-95.) In the brief accompanying the motion, Christian argued “that his plea was
involuntary due to his lack of understanding the gravity of what he was signing while under
stress from immense pain.” (R., p.92.) He explained that, while incarcerated, “he had been
regularly taking prescribed medications and that on the day he was in the mediation and
ultimately entered his guilty plea that he had not been given his pain medication.” (Id.)
He claimed “[t]hat without the medication he was not able to make an intelligent decision
and did not understand that he was waiving a jury trial.” (Id.)
On October 16, 2017, the district court held a hearing on Christian’s motion to
withdraw. (Tr., p.24, Ls.1-10.) The district court informed Christian that it was “his burden
to demonstrate that his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (Tr.,
p.24, Ls.11-13.) Christian provided medical records showing that he “was prescribed three
medications on the date of the mediation, specifically Gabapentin, 600 milligrams;
meloxicam, 7.5 milligrams, and Tramadol, 50 milligrams” and that “he was not given those
medications as he otherwise would have [been] at 8:00 in the morning, but that he was
given his prescribed Gabapentin and Tramadol at 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon” and his
meloxicam “somewhere later in the evening.” (Tr., p.24, L.21 – p.25, L.13.) “[T]he
hearing for the change of plea was at 2:30 p.m.” that day. (Id.)
Christian testified that, on the day of the mediation and the change-of-plea hearing,
he “felt a lot of pressure” and experienced pain that “feels like a toothache” in his leg. (Tr.,
p.29, L.24 – p.30, L.7.) On cross examination, Christian admitted that, on the day of the
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change-of-plea hearing, he did not tell the judge or his attorneys about his pain. (Tr., p.30,
L.23 – p.31, L.6.) The district court asked Christian about questions in his guilty plea
advisory form that should have elicited answers about his pain but did not. (Tr., p.32, L.10
– p.34, L.19.) Christian claimed that he did not refer to his pain in responding to those
questions because he “felt like pressured to hurry up and just to please the court” and that
“[i]t’s hard to explain because there’s a lot going on in my body.” (Tr., p.32, L.19 – p.33,
L.12.)
The state called Dr. Gary Dawson as an expert witness in the areas of pharmacology
and toxicology as it relates to the effects of drugs on performance and behavior. (Tr., p.35,
L.17 – p.36, L.7.) Dr. Dawson has a doctorate in pharmacology, and he reviewed
Christian’s medical records from the Canyon County jail. (Tr., p.36, Ls.12-17.) Dr.
Dawson testified that he had “done a lot of clinical work with chronic pain patients, and
under these circumstances I have not seen a circumstance where missing one dose resulted
in a debilitation.” (Tr., p.40, Ls.2-6.) In Dr. Dawson’s opinion, “the defendant could have
entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea even having missed [his] morning dose.” (Tr.,
p.40, Ls.7-12.)
Dr. Dawson based his opinion on the nature of the three drugs that Christian had
been taking.

Dr. Dawson testified that “[m]eloxicam is a fairly long-acting anti-

inflammatory agent” that “has a very long half-life,” which means “it takes a long time to
eliminate from the body.” (Tr., p.38, L.3 – p.39, L.12.) “[B]ased upon that,” in Dr.
Dawson’s opinion, “missing one dose wouldn’t be catastrophic in any way, shape, or
form.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.9-14.) Dr. Dawson also explained that “Tramadol has about an 8- to
9-hour half-life” and that on the day of the mediation “there would still be some therapeutic
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benefit” from the Tramadol Christian had taken the day before. (Tr., p.39, L.22 – p.40,
L.1.) According to Dr. Dawson, “Gabapentin has a fairly short half-life” but “missing one
dose . . . would not lead to a dramatic increase in the pain level because there’s other
medications still on board.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.15-21.)
Dr. Dawson also gave two additional reasons to support his opinion. First, “the
therapy had been ongoing for some period of time” and “[t]his was not very early in the
treatment period.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.14-22.) Second, Christian had just completed “shortcourse therapy” or “pulse therapy” using a drug called prednisone just a few days before
the mediation and change-of-plea hearing. (Tr., p.38, L.14 – p.39, L.8.) That means “the
benefits of the prednisone would still be there because of the way that it acts”—namely,
“the benefits of the prednisone as a very potent anti-inflammatory can persist for several
days to weeks.” (Id.)
In a written decision, the district court denied Christian’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. (R., pp.102-05.) The district court relied on the “uncontroverted evidence”
presented by the state through Dr. Dawson, the fact that Christian took two of his three
prescribed medications prior to the change-of-plea hearing, the fact that Christian had been
administered prednisone, the effects of which would have lasted days to weeks, and
Christian’s responses to questions on the guilty plea advisory form and from the district
court at the change-of-plea hearing. (R., pp.103-04.) The district court concluded that
Christian “failed to demonstrate that he did not understand the consequences of pleading
guilty.” (R., p.104.)
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Pursuant to the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the district court sentenced
Christian to a unified term of fifteen years, with two years fixed, on each count and ran the
sentences concurrently. (R., pp.113-14.) Christian timely appealed. (R., pp.121-25.)
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ISSUE
Christian states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Christian’s motion
to withdraw his Alford pleas?
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Christian failed to show the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to withdraw his Alford pleas?

9

ARGUMENT
Christian Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
Christian’s Motion To Withdraw His Alford Pleas
A.

Introduction
The district court properly denied Christian’s motion to withdraw his Alford pleas.

Christian had the burden of presenting a just reason to withdraw his Alford pleas. The only
reason Christian presented the district court was that his pain rendered the Alford pleas
involuntary. The district court properly rejected this reason based on statements made by
Christian at the change-of-plea hearing, in his guilty plea advisory form, and in the binding
plea agreement, as well as on Dr. Dawson’s testimony that, based on the medications
Christian had been taking, he would not have been in the kind of pain alleged and, if he
had been, it would have been obvious to everyone in the courtroom. Having properly
rejected the only reason Christian presented, the district court did not abuse its discretion
by denying Christian’s motion to withdraw.
Christian has now, for the first time on appeal, asserted a number of new reasons
why the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea. He failed to
preserve these arguments by presenting them to the district court in the first instance. In
any event, the record contradicts all of the new reasons asserted by Christian. Specifically,
the record reveals no conflict between Christian and his counsel at the time Christian
entered his Alford pleas and confirms that Christian understood the elements of his crimes,
the maximum (and actual) punishment that could (and would) be imposed, and the rights
he would waive by entering his Alford pleas.

10

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review on appeal in cases where a defendant has attempted to

withdraw a guilty plea is whether the district court has properly exercised judicial
discretion as distinguished from arbitrary action.” State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861
P.2d 51, 53 (1993). “‘[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant’s assertions
in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.’”
State v. Hartsock, 160 Idaho 639, 641, 377 P.3d 1102, 1104 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting State
v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537, 211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008)).
C.

The District Court Properly Denied Christian’s Motion To Withdraw After
Rejecting The Only Reason For Withdrawal Christian Presented
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Christian’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. “Withdrawal of a presentence guilty plea is not an automatic
right, and the defendant has the burden of proving that the plea should be allowed to be
withdrawn.” Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55 (citation omitted). “[D]efendants
seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must show a just reason for
withdrawing the plea.” Id. If the defendant shows his plea was not knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary, a “‘just reason’ will be established as a matter of law.” State v. Stone, 147
Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The only reason Christian presented
the district court for withdrawing his guilty plea was that his plea was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary because, on the day of the mediation and change-of-plea hearing,
“he had not been given his pain medication” and was in “immense pain.” (R., p.92.) That
reason is not supported by the record.
The state “produced uncontroverted evidence” that Christian missing a single dose
of his prescribed medication would not have caused pain sufficient to render his plea
11

unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. (R., p.104.) At the time of Christian’s changeof-plea hearing, the only prescribed drug he had not taken for the day was meloxicam. (Id.)
As Dr. Dawson explained, “missing one dose [of meloxicam] wouldn’t be catastrophic in
any way, shape, or form” because meloxicam “has a very long half-life,” which means “it
takes a long time to eliminate from the body,” and Christian had just taken meloxicam the
day before. (Tr., p.39, Ls.9-14; see Defendant’s Exhibit C.)
Moreover, meloxicam is an anti-inflammatory (Tr., p.38, Ls.3-8), and, “just a few
days before” Christian missed his meloxicam dose, he had finished “pulse therapy” using
prednisone, a “very potent anti-inflammatory.” (Tr., p.38, L.23 – p.39, L.8.) According to
Dr. Dawson, “the benefits of the prednisone would still [have been] there because . . .
prednisone . . . can persist for several days to weeks.” (Id.) Based on his review of
Christian’s medical records, Dr. Dawson opined that missing one dose of meloxicam would
not “result[] in a debilitation” and “the defendant could have entered a knowing and
voluntary guilty plea even having missed the morning dose.” (Tr., p.38, L.14 – p.40, L.12.)
Christian did not challenge Dr. Dawson’s interpretation of his medical records or
explanation of the relevant prescription drugs other than by testifying himself that he was
in pain on the day of the change-of-plea hearing. (Tr., p.26, L.12 – p.30, L.7.) But as Dr.
Dawson explained, if Christian had been in the kind of pain he claimed from his sciatica,
it would have been obvious to everyone in the courtroom. (Tr., p.40, L.15 – p.41, L.5; see
R., p.104.) “Yet no one, including the defendant, brought up the matter of pain at the
change of plea hearing.” (R., p.104.)
Furthermore, Christian’s claim of pain is inconsistent with multiple responses he
gave on his guilty plea advisory form, and Christian could not provide a credible
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explanation for the inconsistencies. For example, question ten asked “[a]re you capable of
understanding these proceedings?” (R., p.77.) Christian marked yes. (Id.) When asked
about his answer at the motion-to-withdraw hearing, Christian gave a response that had
nothing to do with his alleged pain: “I just felt like pressured to hurry up and just to please
the court.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.19-25.) Question twelve asked “[i]s there anything going on in
your life that affects your ability to enter a voluntary guilty plea?” (R., p.78.) Christian
marked no. (Id.) When asked about his answer at the motion-to-withdraw hearing,
Christian gave a response that had no basis in the text of the question: “I thought it was
talking about my immediate family and stuff on that question.” 2 (Tr., p.33, Ls.13-18.)
Given Dr. Dawson’s testimony and the inconsistencies between Christian’s behavior and
responses to questions on the day of the change-of-plea hearing and his testimony at the
motion-to-withdraw hearing, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found
pain did not render Christian’s Alford pleas unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary.

2

Christian attempts to bolster his credibility by claiming that, at the sentencing hearing
held one month after the district court denied his motion to withdraw, his testimony was
“consistent with his posture at the plea and motion to withdraw hearing[s].” (Appellant’s
brief, p.6.) Even if testimony given one month after the district court denied Christian’s
motion to withdraw were relevant to whether the district court abused its discretion,
Christian’s testimony at the sentencing hearing was anything but consistent with what he
told the district court at the motion-to-withdraw hearing. At the sentencing hearing, he
claimed he “d[id]n’t remember signing a Rule 11” and “d[id]n’t remember the day of
mediation” and “[t]hat’s why [he] tried to get it withdrawn.” (Tr., p.56, Ls.22-25.) But at
the motion-to-withdraw hearing, Christian readily admitted that he “recall[ed] on August
8th where [he] [was] engaged in a mediation and then later the change of plea” (Tr., p.27,
Ls.8-11); provided details about the mediation (Tr., p.28, Ls.14-22); and admitted that he
“remember[ed] filling out a document called a guilty plea advisory form” (Tr., p.32, Ls.1014). In any event, “the credibility . . . of the defendant’s assertions in support of his motion
to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to decide,” Hartsock, 160 Idaho at 641,
377 P.3d at 1104 (internal quotations and citation omitted), and the trial court, at least
implicitly, found Christian’s testimony incredible (R., pp.103-04).
13

Christian erroneously argues that the district court abused its discretion by applying
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard instead of the “less[] stringent . . . just
reason” standard. (Appellant’s brief, pp.18-19.) Typically, determining whether a plea
was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made is just “[t]he first step in analyzing a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.” State v. Anderson, 156 Idaho 230, 233, 322 P.3d 312,
315 (Ct. App. 2014). The next step is to “determine whether the defendant has shown
another just reason for withdrawing the plea.” Id. Here, however, the district court had no
reason to proceed past the first step because the only potential just reason that Christian
chose to present the district court was that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or
voluntary because he did not take his medication. (R., pp.92, 103.) There could be no
second step in the district court’s analysis because Christian did not even assert “another
just reason for withdrawing the plea.” Anderson, 156 Idaho at 233, 322 P.3d at 315. The
district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting its analysis to the only potential just
reason Christian presented. See Dopp, 124 Idaho at 485, 861 P.2d at 55 (explaining “the
defendant has the burden” and “must show a just reason for withdrawing the plea”).
For the first time on appeal, Christian offers a number of new reasons why he should
have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-18.) He failed to
preserve these arguments by presenting them to the district court and cannot raise them
now. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (“We
have long held that ‘[a]ppellate review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments
that were presented below.’” (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375,
379 (2007))); Stone, 147 Idaho at 333-34, 208 P.3d at 737-38 (refusing to address new
reason for withdrawing guilty plea on appeal where defendant failed to present it to the
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district court). Even if Christian could raise his new theories for the first time on appeal,
they are contradicted by the record.
Christian argues, for the first time on appeal, that his “pleas were undermined by
the apparent conflict between Mr. Christian and his counsel.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)
But Christian’s only evidence of the so-called conflict is a colloquy that took place between
Christian and the district court approximately two weeks before Christian entered his
Alford pleas in which Christian asked for new counsel because “[i]t’s insufficient finding
evidence” and “[n]obody has tried to get any of it.” (Appellant’s brief, p.14 (quoting Tr.,
p.3, L.3 – p.4, L.22).) The district court noted that Christian had asked for new counsel,
but denied the request and told Christian and his counsel “to work out your differences.”
(Tr., p.3, L.13 – p.4, L.2.)
Nothing in the record suggests Christian and his counsel were unable to work out
their differences before Christian entered his Alford pleas. 3 On the contrary, Christian
stated in his guilty plea advisory form, on the same day he entered his Alford pleas, that he
had “an opportunity to review the discovery provided by [his] attorney”; that he did not
“want [his] attorney to take any further action in this case”; and that he was “satisfied with
[his] attorney’s representation.” (R., pp.83-84.) Christian has failed to show any conflict

3

Christian seems to suggest that he switched attorneys shortly after his discussion with the
district court. (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15.) That is not accurate. Christian was
represented by multiple attorneys from the Canyon County Public Defender’s Office
throughout the proceedings below, including Mr. Gatewood, Mr. McCabe, and Mr. Woolf.
(R., pp.2, 24, 52, 58, 62, 73.) The same attorney who represented Christian at the hearing
when Christian asked for a new attorney, Mr. Gatewood, also represented Christian at the
mediation, the change-of-plea hearing, the hearing on the motion to withdraw, and the
sentencing hearing. (R., pp.56, 66, 73, 88, 94, 98, 100, 106.) Moreover, Mr. Gatewood is
listed as “Lead Attorney[]” for Christian on the district court’s case summary. (R., p.2.)
15

between himself and his counsel at the time he entered his Alford pleas, let alone a conflict
sufficient to provide a just reason to withdraw his pleas.
Christian also argues, for the first time on appeal, that he failed to correctly
understand an element of the crime. (Appellant’s brief, pp.17-18.) A plea is invalid
“[w]here a defendant pleads guilty to a crime without having been informed of the crime’s
elements.” State v. Gonzales, 158 Idaho 112, 116, 343 P.3d 1119, 1123 (Ct. App. 2015).
“[T]he constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record
accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were
explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel.” Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S.
175, 183 (2005). “In such a circumstance, a defendant seeking relief from a guilty plea
must satisfactorily counter the ‘natural inference’ that his counsel’s advice was accurate.”
Gonzales, 158 Idaho at 119, 343 P.3d at 1126.
The evidence shows Christian’s attorney explained to him the elements of the
crimes, and Christian has not countered “the ‘natural inference’ that his counsel’s advice
was accurate.” Id. Christian informed the district court in his guilty plea advisory form
that he had “discussed the elements of the offense(s) for which [he was] charged with [his]
attorney.” (R., p.80.) He has provided no evidence that his attorney’s explanation of any
element was not accurate. Cf. Gonzales, 158 Idaho at 115, 119, 343 P.3d at 1122, 1126
(finding defendant “submitted evidence that his attorney’s explanation of the mental
element of the crime was incorrect” where he “filed an affidavit stating that his defense
counsel misinformed him of [the intent] element”).
Instead of presenting such evidence, Christian asks this Court to infer that his
counsel misinformed him of the intent elements of his crimes from statements he made
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during the change-of-plea hearing that he “didn’t mean to do this to her” and he “wish[ed]
[he] never . . . got put [o]n Xanax because that’s what did it.” (Appellant’s brief, p.17
(quoting Tr., p.10, Ls.10-15).) Read in context, however, Christian’s statements that he
did not mean to attack his wife are best understood as statements of remorse rather than
“protestations of innocence.” (Appellant’s brief, p.15.) In fact, immediately after Christian
made the statements, the district court observed: “Well, you seem pretty remorseful today.”
(Tr., p.10, Ls.16-18.)
Furthermore, the record does not support Christian’s suggestion that he was telling
the district court that he lacked the requisite intent when he attacked his wife. As
Christian’s counsel explained at the change-of-plea hearing, Christian had to enter Alford
pleas because “there’s a lot of this he doesn’t recall and remember.” (Tr., p.8, Ls.17-25.)
Christian told the district court that he had “no recollection” of the event and that he “took
a polygraph just so [he] could show [he] wasn’t lying because [he] do[esn’t] remember
any of it.” (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-11, p.10, Ls.21-23 (emphasis added).) Christian’s contradictory
claim that he remembers only that he did not have the requisite intent is, at the very least,
suspect. But even assuming Christian truly believed that he did not intend to attack his
wife, his pleas do not suggest he misunderstood the intent elements of the crimes because
he entered Alford pleas, which means he did not necessarily believe he was guilty of the
crimes, just “that there [was] a likelihood that a jury would convict [him].” (Tr., p.9, Ls.1925.)
Moreover, Christian’s argument that he did not understand the intent elements of
the crimes is belied by the charging document. A defendant has been properly informed
of an element of a crime where the element is stated in the charging document and is “‘a
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self-explanatory legal term or so simple in meaning that it can be expected or assumed that
a lay person understands it.’” Gonzales, 158 Idaho at 116 n.1, 343 P.3d at 1123 n.1
(quoting State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004)). For the
first charge, the grand jury indictment clearly and correctly informed Christian that the
state would have to prove he strangled his wife with a cell phone cord “with the intent to
commit murder.” (R., p.30); see ICJI 1210; I.C. § 18-911. 4 For the second charge, the
grand jury indictment clearly and correctly informed Christian that the state would have to
prove that he “did willfully and unlawfully choke and/or attempt to strangle” his wife.
(Id.); see State v. Williston, 159 Idaho 215, 221-22, 358 P.3d 776, 782-83 (Ct. App. 2015)
(holding charging document sufficiently informed defendant of intent element for
attempted strangulation where it “provided that [the defendant] did ‘willfully and
unlawfully choke or attempt to strangle’ the victim”). Because Christian’s counsel and the
grand jury indictment both explained the intent elements of the charges to Christian, he
cannot invalidate his plea on the basis that he did not understand the intent elements. See
Gonzales, 158 Idaho at 116, 343 P.3d at 1123.
Christian also cobbles together, for the first time on appeal, a list of other errors
allegedly committed by the district court that he believes entitle him to withdraw his guilty
pleas. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.) Specifically, Christian alleges that the district court
did not confirm whether Christian understood “the maximum and minimum punishments,”
“that his plea was voluntary,” or “his right to confront and cross-examine his accusers and
his right to compulsory process” or confirm “whether anyone had pressured him,

4

See also Mayer, 139 Idaho at 648, 84 P.3d at 584 (“[A] layperson of normal intelligence
would understand that murder means to kill another human without justification.”).
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threatened him, or coerced him into pleading.” (Id.) The record contradicts Christian’s
allegations.
The district court confirmed Christian understood the punishment.

Christian

handwrote the maximum fine and imprisonment for both charges in his guilty plea advisory
form. (R., p.80.) He also confirmed that he understood that, “if the District Court does not
impose the specific sentence as recommended by both parties, [he] [would] be allowed to
withdraw [his] plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial.” (R., p.79.) He confirmed in the
binding plea agreement that “he is aware of the maximum penalty associated with” both
charges. (R., p.71.) He also “stipulate[d] and agree[d]” that “[t]he Court will impose a
unified sentence of fifteen years with two years fixed and thirteen years indeterminate.”
(R., p.70.) At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court confirmed that Christian
understood “[t]his Rule 11 states that the court will impose a unified sentence of 15 years
with 2 years fixed and 13 years indeterminate.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-16.) As the district court
observed, “[t]he record in this case clearly reflects that the defendant understood . . . not
only the possible consequences but the exact penalty that would be imposed.” (R., p.104.)
The district court confirmed Christian entered his pleas voluntarily. Christian
acknowledged in his guilty plea advisory form that neither his “attorney [n]or anyone else
forced or coerced [him] in any way into accepting this plea agreement” and that he
“enter[ed] [his] plea freely and voluntarily.” (R., pp.79, 84.) In the binding plea agreement,
he also “acknowledge[d] that he [was] entering into this stipulated, binding plea agreement
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and that his decision [was] not the result of threats
or coercion by any individual, including his attorneys, any representative of the State, or
this Court.” (R., pp.70-71.) At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court asked
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Christian whether, “by pleading guilty today you’re doing this voluntarily,” and Christian
answered “Yes.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4.)
Christian confirmed that he understood his constitutional right to confront his
accusers and call witnesses. The guilty plea advisory form explained these rights to
Christian, and he signed his initials next to this statement: “I understand that by pleading
guilty I am waiving my right to question (confront) the witnesses against me, and present
witnesses and evidence in my defense.” (R., p.76.) Similarly, in the binding plea
agreement, Christian “acknowledge[d] that he [was] aware of . . . the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses and to present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf” and that
he understood “that, by pleading guilty, . . . he [would] give[] up the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses and to present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf in
defense of the charges.” (R., p.71.) Because the record shows Christian understood the
consequences of entering Alford pleas, including the punishment that would be imposed
and the rights he would be waiving, he cannot rely on a lack of understanding the
consequences as a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea.
In sum, Christian presented the district court with a single potential just reason to
withdraw his Alford pleas: that his pleas were involuntary due to pain. (R., p.92.) Relying
on the evidence presented at the hearing on Christian’s motion to withdraw, including Dr.
Dawson’s expert testimony and Christian’s own statements at the change-of-plea hearing,
the district court properly rejected Christian’s proposed just reason. (R., pp.102-04.) The
new reasons Christian has articulated on appeal were not properly preserved and, in any
event, are contradicted by the record. Christian has thus failed to present a just reason to
withdraw his Alford pleas.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s judgment of
conviction entered after Christian entered Alford pleas to battery with the intent to commit
murder and attempted strangulation.
DATED this 9th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of October, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
LARA E. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Jeff Nye
JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
JN/dd

21

